Utah v. John Joseph Thompson : Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1987
Utah v. John Joseph Thompson : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
G. Fred Metos; Yengich, Rich, Xaiz and Metos; Attorney for Appellant.
David L. Wilkinson; Attorney General; Barbara Bearnson; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Respondent.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Thompson, No. 870276.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1689
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : REPLY 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
JOHN JOSEPH THOMPSON, : Case No. 870276 
Defendant/Appellant. Priority No. 2 
THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR THE 
OFFENSES OF OBJECT RAPE, A FIRST DEGREE 
FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF TITLE 76, CHAPTER 5, 
SECTION 402.2, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 AS 
AMENDED, FORCIBLE SODOMY, A FIRST DEGREE 
FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF TITLE 76, CHAPTER 5, 
SECTION 403, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 AS 
AMENDED, AND FORCIBLE SEXUAL ABUSE, A SECOND 
DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF TITLE 76, 
CHAPTER 5, SECTION 404, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
1953 AS AMENDED, IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH, 
JUDGE PRESIDING. 
G. FRED METOS #2250 
YENGICH, RICH, XAIZ & METOS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
175 East 400 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-0320 
DAVID WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
BARBARA BEARSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
FILED 
AUG 81988 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : REPLY 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
JOHN JOSEPH THOMPSON, : Case No. 870276 
Defendant/Appellant. Priority No. 2 
THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR THE 
OFFENSES OF OBJECT RAPE, A FIRST DEGREE 
FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF TITLE 76, CHAPTER 5, 
SECTION 402.2, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 AS 
AMENDED, FORCIBLE SODOMY, A FIRST DEGREE 
FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF TITLE 76, CHAPTER 5, 
SECTION 403, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 AS 
AMENDED, AND FORCIBLE SEXUAL ABUSE, A SECOND 
DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF TITLE 76, 
CHAPTER 5, SECTION 404, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
1953 AS AMENDED, IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH, 
JUDGE PRESIDING. 
G. FRED METOS #2250 
YENGICH, RICH, XAIZ & METOS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
175 East 400 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-0320 
DAVID WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
BARBARA BEARSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
POINT I - THE COMMENTS BY THE PROSECUTOR RELATING TO A MISSING 
WITNESS WERE IMPROPER AND PREJUDICIAL REQUIRING A NEW 
TRIAL FOR APPELLANT 1 
POINT II - APPELLANT WAS THE SUBJECT OF AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE FOR 
THE THREE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES WHEN HE WAS 
ORIGINALLY CHARGED WITH ONLY ONE OFFENSE 7 
CONCLUSION 11 
CASES CITED 
Gass v. United States, 416 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir. 1969) 4 
Griffin v. California. 380 U.S. 609 (1965) 2 
State v. Andreason. 718 P.2d 400 (Utah 1986) 2, 5, 6 
State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983) 10 
State v. Kazda. 540 P.2d 949 (Utah 1975) 1, 2 
State v. O'Brien. 721 P.2d 89 (Utah 1986) 11 
State v. Porter. 705 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1985) 11 
State v. Russell. 733 P.2d 162 (Utah 1987) 9 
State v. Smith. 706 P.2d 1052 (Utah 1985) 2, 4 
State v. Suarez, 736 P.2d 1040 (Utah App. 1982) 11 
State v. Tillman. 250 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987) 8 
State v. Valdez. 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422 (1973) 2, 5 
United States v. Young. 463 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 3, 4 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated, §77-35-19(c) (1953 as amended) 8 
Utah Code Annotated, §77-35-22(e) (1953 as amended) 9 
Utah Code Annotated, §77-35-4(d) (1953 as amended) 10 
Utah Code Annotated, §76-1-402(1) (1953 as amended) 10 
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POINT I 
THE COMMENTS BY THE PROSECUTOR RELATING TO A 
MISSING WITNESS WERE IMPROPER AND PREJUDICIAL 
REQUIRING A NEW TRIAL FOR APPELLANT. 
The remarks by the deputy county attorney relating to a 
missing witness were improper and prejudicial. The respondent, 
in briefing the issue fails to correctly analyze these remarks as 
required by the case law and also fails to correctly assess the 
prejudicial impact of the argument. 
Respondent contends that the argument was proper under 
the standards set forth in State v. Kazda, 540 P.2d 949 (Utah 
1975). In that case the defendant had been arrested late at 
night at the scene of a burglary while he was in the process of 
removing property from a building. The prosecutor argued that 
the defendant had not presented any evidence relating either to 
why he was at the scene of the crime, or what he was doing there. 
The court ruled that the State has a right to argue the evidence 
Those remarks are set out in full in both appellant's and 
respondent's briefs and need not be repeated here. (See Brief of 
Appellant at page 8). 
or lack of evidence presented by the defendant. That situation 
is significantly different than what occurred in the case at bar. 
Here the prosecutor argued that appellant's testimony was not 
corroborated by a particular witness raising the inference that 
appellant should not be believed. The appellant, on the other 
hand, had explained what he was doing with Rosa Pitman, the 
prosecutrix, and why those acts had occurred. 
Furthermore, Kazda is inapplicable to this case due to 
subsequent rulings by this court. The applicable rulings are 
found in State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 1052 (Utah, 1985), and in the 
line of cases beginning with State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 
P.2d 422 (1973), and most recently in State v. Andreason, 718 
P.2d 400 (Utah 1986). The general standard requires a two part 
test: (1) Whether the remarks of counsel call the attention of 
the jurors to matters they would not be justified in consider-
ing; and (2) whether the jurors, in reaching their verdict, were 
probably influenced by the improper remarks. 
The impropriety of remarks relating to a party's fail-
ure to produce particular witnesses is discussed in State v. 
Smith, supra. Before counsel may argue that an opposing party is 
subject to a negative inference from the failure to produce a 
particular witness, a two part test must be met: First, there 
The propiety of this is dubious, at best, when those facts are 
analyzed in light of the ruling in Griffin v. California, 380 
U.S. 609 (1965) (improper for a prosecutor to overtly allude to 
the defendant's failure to testify in his own behalf). 
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must be a showing that the party who did not produce the witness 
had it peculiarly within his power to produce that witness. 
Second, the testimony of that witness would have to elucidate the 
issues at trial. 
With respect to the first requirement, this court noted 
in State v. Smith, supra, that there are two situations that 
would make a witness "peculiarly within the power of a party to 
produce". First, there must be a showing that the witness is 
physically available only to that party. Second, that the wit-
ness has the type of relationship with the opposing party that 
pragmatically renders his testimony unavailable to the party 
seeking to make the "missing witness" argument. Respondent 
concedes that neither of these situations apply to this case. 
Rather, respondent argues that in United States v. Young, 463 
F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1972), that court noted there may be situa-
tions where each side has the capability to physically produce a 
witness and the judge may have the discretion to leave the mat-
ter open for debate. The court stated that such argument may be 
appropriate without giving an instruction to the jury on the 
effect of the failure to call a particular witness. 
A claim that this particular passage from United States 
v, Young, supra, somehow justifies the prosecutor's remarks in 
this case misconstrues what that court was discussing in that 
passage. Respondent also disregards the background relative to 
that court's discussion. With respect to the background, the 
rule in the District of Columbia was that prior to closing argu-
- 3 -
ments counsel was required to request permission from the court 
3 
to make a missing witness argument. The passage cited by re-
spondent was written with this notice requirement as a premise. 
The prosecutor in this case never requested that he be allowed to 
make such an argument nor did he give notice that he intended to 
4 
make such an argument. 
Furthermore, the discussion from United States v. 
Young, supra, cited by respondent was made in relation to the 
necessity of giving a jury instruction on the inference to be 
drawn when a party does not call a particular witness. In making 
the remarks cited by respondent, the Court of Appeals was antici-
pating that trial courts give the specimen instruction which was 
set forth in the court's opinion. That instruction details the 
inferences that are permissible for the jury to draw and the 
circumstances that would justify such inferences. The passage 
quoted by respondent in no way justifies the actions by the 
prosecutor in this case. 
As for the second portion of the test in State v. 
Smith, supra, respondent argues that the witness referred to by 
° See, Gass v. United States, 416 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
4 
At the time this case was tried there was no such notice 
requirements as part of Utah law. However, this court may use 
this case to take the opportunity to enact such a requirement. 
That requirement gives the trial court the opportunity to assess 
whether the party seeking to make the argument has met the 
requirements of State v. Smith, supra. 
5 
The entire text of the instruction is attached in "Appendix A". 
_ 4 _ 
the prosecutor would not have elucidated the issues of the case. 
If respondent is correct, there can be no question that the 
prosecutor's argument was improper. It is clear, however, that 
the reason that the prosecutor made the argument was to claim 
that appellant's testimony has not been corroborated and there-
fore should not be believed. As noted in appellant's initial 
brief, this case turned on the credibility of either Ms. Pitman 
or appellant. Consequently, the testimony of that witness would 
be corroborative of one of the two critical witnesses, rather 
than cumulative as respondent contends. That witness' testimony 
would therefore have elucidated the issues at trial. 
The final issue that needs to be discussed is that of 
the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's comment. As described 
in Valdez, the question is: whether the jurors were probably 
influenced by the improper remarks. Respondent concedes that 
appellant's description of the law in this state is correct with 
respect to the effect of an improper argument being made when the 
case involves conflicting evidence. See State v. Andreasonf 
Q 
supra, at 403. Respondent argues that the prosecutor's comments 
were not as egregious as the comments made by prosecutors in 
g 
other cases. However, respondent does not analyze the comments 
Brief of Respondent at page 13. 
7
 Brief of Appellant at 12-13. 
o 
See also Brief of Appellant at page 13. 
g 
See Brief of Respondent at page 11. 
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of this prosecutor in light of the critical issue at trial. As 
previously noted, the critical issue was the credibility of 
appellant as opposed to that of Ms. Pitman, The argument he made 
was that part of the testimony given made by appellant which 
could have been corroborated by an independent witness was not so 
corroborated. In a case where the evidence is conflicting, such 
as this one, the jurors are more susceptible to the influence of 
such an remark. State v. Andreason, supra. Consequently, the 
jurors were probably influenced by the remark. 
The other arguments that respondent makes with respect 
to the issue of the prejudicial effect of the improper comments 
are that the court's jury instructions cured the error and that 
the comment was only a small part of the prosecutor's arguments. 
With respect to the curative jury instructions, respondent cites 
to the instructions stating that the jurors were to be governed 
solely by the evidence introduced at trial (R. 87) and the in-
struction relating to the presumption of innocence and burden of 
proof. (R. 81) Respondent provides no authority for the propo-
sition that these particular instructions cure the prejudice 
created by an improper argument. Furthermore, this argument does 
not address the nature of the remarks as they relate to the issue 
that the jury had to decide. 
Finally, respondent claims that the improper remark was 
only one part of a long and detailed argument. The prosecutor's 
argument was long and detailed covering over sixteen pages of 
transcript. (Tr. 259-276) However, respondent ignores the fact 
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that the remark took place at the very end of the argument. (Tr. 
275) There is less than one page of further argument by the 
prosecutor after the improper comment. The improper remark was 
made at a point in the argument where it would have a substantial 
impact on the jury. Respondent disregards where in the closing 
argument that the improper comment was made and the potential 
effect of such a comment at the end of the closing argument. 
The remark by the prosecutor relating to the missing 
witness was improper and likely to have influenced the jury's 
verdict. Appellant's conviction should be reversed and the case 
remanded to the district court for a new trial. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT WAS THE SUBJECT OF AN ILLEGAL 
SENTENCE FOR THE THREE LESSER INCLUDED OF-
FENSES WHEN HE WAS ORIGINALLY CHARGED WITH 
ONLY ONE OFFENSE. 
Respondent, in its brief, misconstrues appellant's 
arguments regarding the propriety of sentencing appellant on 
alternative charges. Respondent then answers those "straw man" 
arguments with correct statements of the law. Consequently, the 
respondent's analysis of this issue simply does not address the 
issue raised by appellant. 
Appellant does not question that the three offenses for 
which he was convicted are lesser and included offenses of the 
aggravated sexual assault with which he was originally charged. 
Nor does appellant claim that the court's instructions on the 
- 7 -
lesser included offenses were improper. The critical issue is 
whether appellant can be sentenced for three offenses when these 
offenses were originally charged as alternatives in the Informa-
tion. 
Respondent argues that appellant waived any right to 
raise this issue on appeal because counsel failed to object to 
the jury instructions on the lesser offenses. As authority for 
this proposition, respondent cites Utah Code Annotated §77-35-
19(c) (1953 as amended). However, that statute addresses only 
assigning error to either a portion of the jury instructions as 
given or a failure to give a requested instruction to the jury. 
That statute does not address how the courts must approach alter-
native charges, verdicts or sentencing on such charges. Appel-
lant does not question the propriety of the lesser included 
offense instructions. The real issue here is how a court is to 
sentence with respect to alternative charges. Therefore, Utah 
Code Annotated, §77-35-19(c) (1953 as amended) offers no guidance 
whatsoever in resolving the issue raised by appellant. 
Respondent claims that by failing to object to separate 
verdicts and by allowing the court to inform the jury that they 
may convict of any one or all of the lesser included offenses 
appellant waived his right to challenge the sentencing on all 
three alternative charges. As described in appellant's brief the 
alternate verdict forms were a necessity. Those alternatives 
were not for a single offense that could be committed in differ-
ent manners. See, State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987). 
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The alternative lesser offenses all are separate crimes. Each 
has individual elements and one has a different punishment. (Two 
of the offenses were first degree felonies and one was a second 
degree felony). Consequently, jury unanimity was required for a 
finding of guilt on each of the alternative offenses. Separate 
verdicts were required for each offense. State v. Russell, 733 
P.2d 162 (Utah 1987). An objection to the verdict forms or the 
response to the jury's question would not have been appropriate. 
Respondent simply disregards the question of separate 
elements and different punishments when addressing the waiver 
claim. Likewise, respondent disregards the fact that the claim 
involved in this case is that appellant is the subject of an 
illegal sentence. Utah Code Annotated, §77-35-22(e) (1953 as 
amended) allows such a sentence to be corrected at any time. In 
other words, there is no such thing as waiver when the court is 
addressing a claimed illegal sentence. 
Appellant argued in his original brief that the sen-
tencing procedure in this case constituted an improper amendment 
to the information. (See Brief of Appellant at pages 18-19) 
Respondent mentions that appellant received concurrent 
sentences on these alternative convictions. Implicitly 
respondent seems to be arguing that there is no harm from this 
sentence to appellant. However, the Utah State Board of Pardons 
uses guidelines and a time matrix in determining the length of 
time an inmate must serve on a prison commitment. Additional 
concurrent convictions have the effect of raising appellant's 
guideline used to determine the length of his incarceration by 
about 27 months. (See the Board of Pardons time matrix attached 
as "Appendix 3"). 
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Utah Code Annotated, §77-35-4(d) (1953 as amended) prohibits an 
amendment to an information or indictment that involves "addi-
tional or different" offenses. Respondent argues that a lesser 
included offense is not such an amendment because it does not 
involve a different offense. Appellant does not question the 
fact that a lesser included offense is included in the original 
charge. State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983) For that 
reason a lesser included offense is not a different charge than 
that involved in the original indictment or information. 
However, when addressing the amendment issue respondent 
simply disregards the first alternative of prohibited amendments 
to indictments or informations. Utah Code Annotated, §77-35-4(d) 
(1953 as amended) also prohibits additional offenses from being 
charged. Simple arithmetic tells us that when appellant is 
originally charged with one offense and is ultimately sentenced 
for three offenses, there has been an amendment to the informa-
tion resulting in additional charges. Consequently, sentencing 
appellant for all three lesser offenses constitutes an improper 
amendment to the information. 
Appellant also argued that since he was charged only 
with one offense that single charge was by definition a single 
criminal episode as defined in Utah Code Annotated, §76-1-402(1) 
(1953 as amended). The result is that appellant could only be 
sentenced for one offense. (See Brief of Appellant at pages 19-
20). Respondent answers that argument citing cases where defen-
dants were charged and convicted of multiple offenses arising out 
- 10 -
of the same episode and those sentences were upheld on appeal. 
Respondent again disregards the fact that appellant in this case 
12 
was charged with only one offense. That makes the series of 
sex acts constituting lesser included offenses a single criminal 
episode for purposes of sentencing. 
Appellant was illegally sentenced for three offenses 
after being charged with only one offense. This court should 
order two of these sentences to be vacated and remand the case to 
the district court with an order that appellant be sentenced on 
only one of the three lesser included offenses. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the improper argument of the prosecutor and 
the prejudicial effect of such an argument, appellant's convic-
tion should be reversed and the case remanded to the district 
court for a new trial. Furthermore, the sentences for two of the 
lesser included offenses should be vacated and the case should be 
remanded to the district with an order that appellant be sen-
State v. Suarez, 736 P.2d 1040 (Utah App. 1987); State v. 
O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896 (Utah 1986), State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174 
(Utah 1985). 
12 
Whether appellant could have been charged with a separate 
offense of aggravated sexual assault for each separate sex act is 
not before this court. 
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tenced for only one lesser offense. 
Dated this day of August, 1988. 
G. FRED METOS #2250 
YENGICH, RICH, XAIZ & METOS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
175 East 400 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-0320 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of August, 1988, 
I delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing to Barbara 
Bearnson, Assistant Attorney General, at 236 State Capitol Build-
ing, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114. 
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APPENDIX A 
The following is the specimen instruction on missing 
witnesses provided in United States v. Young, supra: 
Counsel have argued that you should draw an 
inference from the absence of certain witnesses. The 
court has determined that each side had the ability to 
produce the witnesses. If you conclude that the 
testimony of a witness would have cast significant 
light on the issues, and that it would have been 
natural for one of the parties to have called that 
witness in support of his presentation if the facts 
known by the witness has been favorable to the position 
of that party, you may infer that if the witness had 
been called he would have given testimony that would 
have been unfavorable to that party which failed to 
call him. But you are not required to draw that 
inference. And if you think that it would have been 
equally natural for each of the parties to have called 
the witness, and that each might equally have been 
expected to do so, then you may rightly conclude that 
since an equal inference could be drawn against each 
party, they cancel each other out. And if the matter 
seems doubtful, then you may rightly decide that no 
inference should be drawn from the absence of the 
witness. In that event, your verdict should be based 
on the evidence that was presented in court, and should 
not be affected by the witnesses, who were not called. 
United States v. Young, supra, at 944. 
APPENDIX B 
Appellant's History Risk Assessment put him into the 
"excellent" category. The time matrix reflects that his minimum 
time of incarceration should be sixty months for a first degree 
felony. When the concurrent alternative commitments for another 
first degree felony and second degree sex offense are factored 
into the matrix appellant's minimum time of incarceration is 
eighty-seven months, a twenty-seven month difference. 
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